Dialectic Delicacies in Arguing for Agential Knowledge
Derek Lam
Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2023, Vol XVII, Issue 1, pp. pp. 7-29, DOI: https://doi.org/10.62229/rrfaxvii-1/1
Published: 11 May , 2026 Download Pdf
Cite as: Lam, Derek: Dialectic Delicacies in Arguing for Agential Knowledge. In: Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 17, iss. 1, pp. 7-29, 2023, ISSN: 1843-9969.
Abstract: An agent who acts intentionally knows what she’s doing. There are reasons for thinking that the agent’s warrant for such kind of agential knowledge isn’t based on observation. How can an agent attain warrant for her agential knowledge non observationally though? Recently, some philosophers have borrowed the entitlement based approach to self knowledge about our mind in attempt to answer this question. By highlighting the proof vs. explanation distinction, I’ll argue that this approach faces a dilemma: its key argument works neither as a proper proof for the relevant kind of entitlement nor as a proper explanation of how the relevant kind of entitlement is generated.
Keywords: Anscombe; epistemic entitlement; intentional action; self-knowledge
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