Nora Grigore – Explaining Actions: the Model of Teleological Explanation and its Difficulties

Explaining Actions: the Model of Teleological Explanation and its Difficulties

Nora Grigore

 

Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2022, Vol XVI, Issue 2, pp. 45-66, DOI: https://doi.org/10.62229/rrfaxvi-2/3

Published: 6 June, 2025  Download Pdf

Cite as: Grigore, Nora : Explaining Actions: the Model of Teleological Explanation and its Difficulties. In: Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 16, iss. 2, pp. 45-66, 2025, ISSN: 1843-9969.

 

Abstract: The classical model for explaining an action (i.e. for answering the question why someone has done something) usually puts an agent’s desires at the center of the explanation: it is because the agent desired something that the action took place. Collins argues that an appeal to purposes could be a more appropriate explanation, that is, he offers a teleological account of action. In his view, actions could be described as a “compensation” for a perceived lack, for an unaccomplished purpose of the agent, in the way a thermostat or a helmsman brings corrections to a perceived state of affairs. The purpose of my essay is to discuss the difficulties encountered by his proposal. I argue that one needs a clearer account for what may count as “compensatory” in order for the theory to be able to distinguish between a random event, a causal effect and a compensatory action.

Keywords: action, purpose, teleological, explanation, compensatory

 

Bibliography

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