Abstract. I argue that, in order to have a proper understanding of Carnap’s views
on ontology in his ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’, one must take into
account an assumption explicitly formulated elsewhere regarding what should be
taken as ‘real’. Approached in this manner, his views are a lot more powerful
than may seem otherwise. The proper role of ontology is considered and some
misunderstandings regarding facts and language are cleared away. An
explanation of the separation of linguistic frameworks in terms of functional
categories is briefly discussed and a few observations are made about the relation
between ontology and metaphysics.
Keywords: Carnap, ontology, philosophy of language, pragmatism
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