Abstract. In this paper I discuss the Newman problem in the context of
contemporary epistemic structural realism (ESR). I formulate Newman’s objection
in terms that apply to today’s ESR and then evaluate a defence of ESR based on
Carnap’s use of Ramsey sentences and Hilbert’s ε-operator. I show that this
defence improves the situation by allowing a formal stipulation of non-structural
constraints. However, it fails short of achieving object individuation in the context
of satisfying the Ramsified form of a theory. Thus, while limiting the scope of
Newman’s argument, Carnap sentences do not fully solve the problem.
Keywords: epistemic structural realism, Newman problem, Ramseification,
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