Abstract. In this paper I offer a conceptually tighter, quasi-Fregean solution to the
concept horse paradox based on the idea that the unterfallen relation is
asymmetrical. The solution is conceptually tighter in the sense that it retains the
Fregean principle of separating sharply between concepts and objects, it retains
Frege’s conclusion that the sentence ‘the concept horse is not a concept’ is true,
but does not violate our intuitions on the matter. The solution is only ‘quasi’-
Fregean in the sense that it rejects Frege’s claims about the ontological import of
natural language and his analysis thereof.
Keywords: concept, object, unterfallen, history of analytic philosophy.
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