{"id":68,"date":"2017-12-11T18:14:33","date_gmt":"2017-12-11T18:14:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/?p=68"},"modified":"2017-12-14T08:37:33","modified_gmt":"2017-12-14T08:37:33","slug":"ostension-and-demonstrative-reference-by-gheorghe-stefanov","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/ostension-and-demonstrative-reference-by-gheorghe-stefanov\/","title":{"rendered":"OSTENSION AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE by Gheorghe \u0218tefanov"},"content":{"rendered":"

RFA-VIII-2-Stefanov<\/a>
\nDownload PDF of the article<\/a><\/p>\n

Author: Gheorghe \u0218tefanov<\/p>\n

Abstract. The strong similarity between the use of ostension and that of a simple
\ndemonstrative to predicate something of an object seems to conflict with equally
\nstrong intuitions according to which, while \u201cthis\u201d does usually refer to an object,
\nthe gesture of holding an object in your hand and showing it to an audience does
\nnot refer to the demonstrated object. This paper argues that the problem is
\nauthentic and provides a solution to it. In doing so, a more general thought is
\ngiven support by the approach used. Namely, the thought that our abilities to
\ndirectly refer to things require some basic referential abilities exhibited in
\nostension and the use of demonstratives which, in their turn, rest upon our
\nabilities to cooperate in performing non-communicative actions on our
\nenvironment. Several concepts introduced in order to solve the initial problem
\ncan be used to articulate this thought in more detail.<\/p>\n

Keywords: ostension, demonstratives, direct reference, tagging, this-predication.<\/p>\n

REFERENCES<\/p>\n

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1963. Intention, second edition, Harvard University Press.
\nBach, Kent. 1992. \u201cIntentions and Demonstrations\u201d, Analysis, 52:140-146.
\nBrandom, Robert B. 2008. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Oxford University Press.
\nFrege, Gottlob. 1956. \u201cThe Thought: A Logical Inquiry\u201d, Mind 65 (259):289-311.
\nGrice, H.P. 1957. \u201cMeaning\u201d, Philosophical Review 66:377-388.
\nGrice, H.P. 1969. \u201cUtterer\u2019s Meaning and Intention\u201d, Philosophical Review 78(2):147-177.
\nKaplan, David. 1977. \u201cDemonstratives\u201d. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (Eds.), 1989, Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, pp. 481-563.
\nKaplan, David. 1978. \u201cDthat\u201d. In Peter Cole (Ed.), Syntax and Semantics. Academic Press, pp. 221-243.
\nKaplan, David. 1989. \u201cAfterthoughts\u201d. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, pp. 565-614.
\nKing, Jeffrey. 2014. \u201cSpeaker Intentions in Context\u201d, No\u00fbs, 48(2):219-237.
\nKripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press.
\nLyons, John. 1977. Semantics, Cambridge University Press.<\/p>\n

McGinn, Colin. 1981. \u201cThe Mechanism of Reference\u201d, Synthese, 49:157-186.
\nNunberg, Geoffrey. 1993. \u201cIndexicality and Deixis\u201d, Linguistics and Philosophy, 16:1-43.
\nPerry, John. 2009. \u201cDirecting Intentions\u201d. In Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi (Eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford University Press, pp. 187-207.
\nQuine, W.V.O. 1950. \u201cIdentity, Ostension, and Hypostasis\u201d, Journal of Philosophy, 47(22):621-633.
\nReimer, Marga. 1992. \u201cThree Views of Demonstrative Reference\u201d, Synthese 93:373-402.
\nRussell, Bertrand. 1940. Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth, Norton.
\nRussell, Bertrand. 1948. Human Knowledge, Simon and Schuster.
\nSzufnarowska, J., Rohlfing, K.J., Fawcett, C., & Gredeb\u00e4ck, G. 2014. \u201cIs Ostension anymore than Attention?\u201d, Scientific Reports, 4, 530 4.
\n\u015etefanov, Gheorghe. forthcoming. \u201cJustifying Knowledge Claims after the Private Language Argument\u201d. Forthcoming in Costreie, Sorin (Ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy. New Perspectives on the Tradition, Springer.
\nWettstein, Howard. 1984. \u201cHow to Bridge the Gap between Meaning and Reference\u201d, Synthese, 84: 63-84.
\nWittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophische Untersuchungen. Blackwell.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Download PDF of the article Author: Gheorghe \u0218tefanov Abstract. The strong similarity between the use of ostension and that of a simple demonstrative to predicate something of an object seems to conflict with equally strong intuitions according to which, while \u201cthis\u201d does usually refer to an object, the gesture of holding an object in your… <\/p>\n

Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[17],"tags":[8,9,10,11,12],"class_list":["post-68","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-gheorghe-stefanov","tag-demonstratives","tag-direct-reference","tag-ostension","tag-tagging","tag-this-predication","xfolkentry","clearfix"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":163,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68\/revisions\/163"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}