{"id":50,"date":"2017-12-11T17:58:12","date_gmt":"2017-12-11T17:58:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/?p=50"},"modified":"2017-12-14T08:50:19","modified_gmt":"2017-12-14T08:50:19","slug":"the-problem-of-truth-in-the-classical-analysis-of-knowledge-by-filip-v-rossi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/the-problem-of-truth-in-the-classical-analysis-of-knowledge-by-filip-v-rossi\/","title":{"rendered":"THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH  IN THE CLASSICAL ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE by Filip V. Rossi"},"content":{"rendered":"<a href=\"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/12\/RFA-VIII-2-Rossi.pdf\" class=\"pdfemb-viewer\" style=\"\" data-width=\"max\" data-height=\"max\" data-toolbar=\"bottom\" data-toolbar-fixed=\"off\">RFA-VIII-2-Rossi<\/a>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/12\/RFA-VIII-2-Rossi.pdf\">Download PDF article<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Author: Filip V. Rossi<\/p>\n<p>Abstract. In this article I propose a new problem for the classical analysis of<br \/>\nknowledge (as justified true belief) and all analyses belonging to its legacy. The gist<br \/>\nof my argument is that truth as a condition for a belief to be knowledge is<br \/>\nproblematic insofar there is no definition of truth. From this, and other remarks<br \/>\nrelating to the possibility of defining truth (or lack thereof) and about what truth<br \/>\ntheories fit our thoughts about knowledge, I conclude that as long as truth is<br \/>\nunquestioningly taken as a condition of knowing, knowledge can never be<br \/>\ndefined in a way that could satisfy our intuitions about it.<\/p>\n<p>Keywords: knowledge, truth, pseudo-concept, definition, correspondence theory, intuition<\/p>\n<p>REFERENCES<\/p>\n<p>Aristotel, 2007, Metafizica [Metaphysics], trans. by Andrei Cornea, Humanitas, Bucure\u0219ti.<br \/>\nAyer, A.J., 1956, The Problem of Knowledge, MacMillan, London.<br \/>\nCarnap, Rudolf, 1996, \u201cThe Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language\u201d, Erkenntnis, vol. 2; translated in: Sahotra Sarkar (Ed.), 1996, Logical Empiricism at Its Peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath, Garland, New York &amp; London, pp. 60-81.<br \/>\nChisholm, Roderick, 1957, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.<br \/>\nClark, Michael, 1963, \u201cKnowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier\u2019s Paper\u201d, in: Analysis, 24.2, pp. 46-48.<br \/>\nde Aquino, Toma, 1997, Summa Theologiae. Despre Dumnezeu [&#8230;On God], trans. by Gheorghe Sterpu and Paul G\u0103le\u0219anu, Ed. \u0218tiin\u021bific\u0103, Bucure\u0219ti.<br \/>\nGettier, Edmund, 1963, \u201cIs Justified True Belief Knowledge?\u201d, in: Analysis, 23.6, pp. 121-123.<br \/>\nGoldman, Alvin, 1967, \u201cA Causal Theory of Knowing\u201d, in: Journal of Philosophy, 64.12, pp. 357-372.<br \/>\nKant, Immanuel, 1992, Lectures on Logic, trans. and edited by J. Michael Young, Cambridge University Press, (series: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation).<br \/>\nPlantinga, Alvin, 1993, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, Oxford.<br \/>\nRussell, Bertrand, 2004, Problemele Filosofiei [Problems of Philosophy], 3 rd edition, Ed. All, Bucure\u0219ti.<br \/>\nSosa, Ernest, 1964, \u201cThe Analysis of \u2018Knowledge That P\u2019\u201d, in: Analysis, 25.1, pp. 1-8;<br \/>\nTarski, Alfred, 1956, \u201cThe Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages\u201d, in: Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, University Press, Oxford.<br \/>\nWilliamson, Timothy, 2002, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford University Press.<br \/>\nWoodin, Hugh, 2001, \u201cThe Continuum Hypothesis, Part I\u201d, in: Notices of the American Mathematical Society, 48.6, pp. 567-576.<br \/>\nZagzebski, Linda, 1994, \u201cThe Inescapability of Gettier Problems\u201d, in: The Philosophical Quarterly, 44.174, pp. 65-73.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp; Download PDF article Author: Filip V. Rossi Abstract. In this article I propose a new problem for the classical analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) and all analyses belonging to its legacy. The gist of my argument is that truth as a condition for a belief to be knowledge is problematic insofar there&hellip; <\/p>\n<p><a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/the-problem-of-truth-in-the-classical-analysis-of-knowledge-by-filip-v-rossi\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[20],"tags":[25,24,26,21,23,22],"class_list":["post-50","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-filip-v-rossi","tag-correspondence-theory","tag-definition","tag-intuition","tag-knowledge","tag-pseudo-concept","tag-truth","xfolkentry","clearfix"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=50"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":167,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50\/revisions\/167"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=50"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=50"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=50"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}