{"id":47,"date":"2017-12-11T17:54:54","date_gmt":"2017-12-11T17:54:54","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/?p=47"},"modified":"2017-12-15T18:18:49","modified_gmt":"2017-12-15T18:18:49","slug":"the-scope-of-the-truthmaker-requirement-by-adam-lovett","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.srfa.ro\/rrfa\/the-scope-of-the-truthmaker-requirement-by-adam-lovett\/","title":{"rendered":"THE SCOPE OF THE TRUTHMAKER REQUIREMENT by Adam Lovett"},"content":{"rendered":"RFA-VIII-2-Lovett<\/a>\n

Download PDF article<\/a><\/p>\n

Author: Adam Lovett<\/p>\n

Abstract. Truths require truthmakers, many think. In this paper I will discuss the scope of this requirement. Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that, necessarily, all truths require truthmakers. I shall argue against this claim. I shall argue against it on the basis of its implications. I shall first consider its implications
\nwhen applied to synthetic, contingent propositions. If the truthmaker requirement
\napplies to these propositions, so I shall argue, it is not possible for there to be
\nnothing, and it is not possible for any (possibly) accompanied entity to exist on its
\nown. I shall then consider its implications when applied to modal propositions,
\nspecifically those concerning possible existence. I shall argue that if the truthmaker
\nrequirement applies to such propositions, then there can be no relation which is
\nequivalent to metaphysical explanation, which \u2013 I shall suggest \u2013 amounts to a
\ndenial of the existence of grounding.<\/p>\n

REFERENCES<\/p>\n

Armstrong, David. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
\n_____. 2004. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
\nAudi, Paul. 2012. \u201cA Clarification and Defence of the Notion of Grounding.\u201d In Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding The Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schneider. Cambridge University Press.
\nBacon, Andrew. 2013. \u201cQuantificational Logic and Empty Names.\u201d Philosophers\u2019 Imprint 13 (24).
\nBigelow, John. 1988. The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist\u2019s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
\nCameron, Ross. 2008a. \u201cTruthmakers, Realism and Ontology.\u201d Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62): 107-28.
\n_____. 2008b. \u201cTurtles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality.\u201d Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230): 1-14.
\nEfird, David, and Tony Stoneham. 2009. \u201cIs Metaphysical Nihilism Interesting?\u201d Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2): 210-31.<\/p>\n

Fine, Kit. 2012. \u201cGuide to Ground.\u201d In Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder. Cambridge University Press.
\nJago, Mark. 2012. \u201cThe Truthmaker Non-Maximalist\u2019s Dilemma.\u201d Mind 121 (484): 903-18.
\nLiggins, David. 2005. \u201cTruthmakers and Explanations.\u201d In Truthmakers: The Contemporary
\nDebate, edited by Helen Beebee and Dodd Julian. New York: Oxford University Press.
\nLowe, E. Jonathan. 2006. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation For Natural Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
\nLycan, William. 1994. Modality and Meaning. London: Kluwer Academic.
\nMerricks, Trenton. 2007. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
\nMolnar, George. 2000. \u201cTruthmakers For Negative Truths.\u201d Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1): 72\u201386.
\nMulligan, Kevin, Barry Smith, and Peter Simons. 1984. \u201cTruthmakers.\u201d Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3): 287-321.
\nParsons, Josh. 1999. \u201cThere Is No \u2018Truthmaker\u2019 Argument Against Nominalism.\u201d Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3).
\nRestall, Greg. 1996. \u201cTruth, Entailment and Necessity.\u201d Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2): 331-40.
\nRodr\u00edguez Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2005. \u201cWhy Truthmakers.\u201d In Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Helen Beebee and Dodd Julian. New York: Oxford University Press.
\nRosen, Gideon. 2010. \u201cMetaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.\u201d In Modality: Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
\nSainsbury, R.M. 2005. Reference Without Referents. Oxford University Press.
\nSchaffer, Jonathan. 2010a. \u201cMonism: The Priority of the Whole.\u201d The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239): 307-24.
\n_____. 2010b. \u201cThe Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker.\u201d Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239): 307-24.
\nSider, Theodore. 2010. Logic For Philosophy. Oxford University Press. Simons, Jonathan, and Barry Smith. 2007. \u201cTruthmaker Explanations.\u201d
\nIn Metaphysics and Truthmaking, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer. Frankfurt: Ontos.
\nTrogdon, Kelly. 2013. \u201cGrounding: Necessary or Contingent.\u201d Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4): 465-85.
\nWilliamson, Timothy. 1999. \u201cTruthmakers and The Converse Barcan.\u201d Dialectica 53 (3-4): 253-70.
\n_____. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Download PDF article Author: Adam Lovett Abstract. Truths require truthmakers, many think. In this paper I will discuss the scope of this requirement. Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that, necessarily, all truths require truthmakers. I shall argue against this claim. I shall argue against it on the basis of its implications. I shall first consider… <\/p>\n

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