Abstract. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Russell\u2019s formal logic has been criticized by some formal logicians as not having fully precise syntax (form). However, he is guided by the principle of formal logic, (Form) that proof depends entirely on form, independently of content. This is a profoundly questionable view of proof. It conflicts with recognizing that (i) \u201cThe set of dogs is a non-self-member\u201d and (ii) \u201cThe set of cats is a non-self-member\u201d are attributing different properties in spite of having the same predicate. The predicate form Rx: \u201cx is a non-self-member\u201d is common to (i) and (ii) but the content of the predicate, the property attributed, is different. This is the key to resolving Russell\u2019s paradox and is unavailable to Russell due to his commitment to (Form). His \u201cVicious Circle Principle\u201d is not well stated and its concern with content conflicts with (Form). But a proper understanding of the principle does provide an answer to the \u201cTruthteller Paradox\u201d. That allows me to close on a note of agreement with Russell.<\/p>\n\n\n\n